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Abstract: One of Coase’s central insights is that distinguishing between the generator and recipient of an externality is of limited value because externality problems are reciprocal. We reconsider
the relevance of the identity of the generator in a model with non-contractible investment ex ante
but frictionless bargaining over the externality ex post. In this framework, a party may distort
its investment to worsen the other’s threat point in bargaining. We demonstrate that the presence
of this distortion depends, among other factors, on whether the investing party is a generator.
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1. Introduction
One of the most important insights in Coase’s (1960) classic “Problem of Social Cost” is his
emphasis on the reciprocal nature of externality problems:
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what
has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing
with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm
on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B
or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.
(Coase 1960, p. 2)
In this paper we seek to understand whether the reciprocal nature of the externality problem
obviates the need to distinguish between the generator and recipient of an externality or whether
there is still some value in the distinction.
We present a model with frictionless bargaining over the externality and other variables ex
post but with transactions cost in the form of non-contractible investment ex ante. (The logic
behind the model is that the initial investment decisions made by the first party to locate in an
area will be non-contractible if the second party with whom the first will eventually negotiate
has not yet shown up.) In this model, there is an asymmetry between the generator and the
recipient that makes the distinction between them economically meaningful. The asymmetry
arises because the generator’s preferred level of the externality is an interior solution which may
depend on its ex ante investment. By contrast, in the case of a purely negative externality, the
recipient’s preferred level is always zero, a corner solution that is independent of its investment.
For example, consider the case of an airport generating noise harming a nearby homeowner raised
in Thrasher v. Atlanta.1 Allocating an injunction right to the airport essentially gives it a right
to produce as much noise as it likes. The airport will have an incentive to distort its ex ante
investment—for example expanding the runway to accommodate larger (and noisier) planes or
building the runway closer to the homeowner—to increase its interior solution for its preferred
externality level. In this way the airport can credibly threaten more harm to the homeowner in the
1

Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934). This and the subsequent legal cases we cite
were originally cited in Coase (1960).
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event that bargaining over the noise level breaks down, thus allowing the airport to extract more
bargaining surplus. Allocating an injunction right to the homeowner gives him the right to stop
any noise from the airport. He can credibly threaten this same outcome whether his residence is
a hovel or a mansion. Regardless of the size of the homeowner’s investment in his residence,
forbidding the airport to emit noise causes the same harm to it, forcing it to either shut down
operations or pay for a device to muffle the noise. Hence an injunction right would not induce
the homeowner to distort his ex ante investment as it would the airport.
In order to mitigate the distortion from the identified strategic effect, it may be efficient to
weaken rights if the holder is a generator. For example if the airport is the rights holder (say
by virtue of its having been in operation before the construction of the nearby residence in a
“coming to the nuisance” regime in which the first party to locate obtains the rights), there are
cases in which it would have been socially more efficient to have allocated it a damage right
rather than an injunction right, that is, the right to collect damages for reducing its noise level
to suit the homeowner rather than the right to set the noise level directly. There is no analogous
benefit to weakening rights for a recipient since the identified strategic effect does not arise for
a recipient. Consequently, we find that allocating an injunction right to the first mover is always
more efficient than a damage right if the first mover is a recipient; but whether an injunction or
a damage right is more efficient if the first mover is a generator depends on the parameters.
The “generator” label for the party that prefers an interior solution for the externality level
and “recipient” for the party that prefers a corner solution are appealing because they continue
to be well-defined if the negative-externality problem is translated into the equivalent positiveexternality one (mapping, say, pollution into pollution abatement). There is natural maximum that
would be preferred by the recipient, namely abating pollution until the environment is returned to
the state without any of the generator’s pollution (it may prefer an even cleaner environment but
the government typically would not enforce such a demand); there is no natural corner for the
(negative) amount of abatement that the generator would prefer. Appendix A shows that calling
the party that prefers a corner solution for the externality the “generator” and the party preferring
a corner solution the “recipient” is consistent with a first-principles definition of the generator
2

as the party that chooses an action affecting the recipient’s utility. The appendix outlines the
assumptions necessary to make the definitions consistent.
One assumption necessary to make the definitions consistent is that the externality be purely
negative. The analysis in Section 4 focuses exclusively on this canonical case. In Section 5.2,
we extend the analysis to the case of a mixed externality providing benefits to the recipient at low
levels but generating harm at higher levels. In this case, the recipient also has an interior solution
for its preferred externality level, blurring the strategic asymmetry between the generator and
recipient. Still, we show that there are certain rights regimes under which the distinction between
generator and recipient continues to be economically meaningful even for a mixed externality.
Is the identified strategic effect a real-world phenomenon or just a theoretical nicety? One of
the more egregious cases of a party’s investing to harm another’s bargaining threat point is the
“spite fence” built by millionaire Charles Crocker in San Francisco during the 1870s, described
in Tamony (1952). Crocker offered to buy Nicholas Yung’s property, which was surrounded by
Crocker’s estate. After Yung refused to sell, Crocker built a 40-foot-high wall surrounding Yung’s
house on three sides, blocking the light and air circulation. Although Yung refused to sell to his
dying day (becoming a cause célèbre for the common man struggling against the establishment),
the wall succeeded in convincing Yung’s heirs to sell out.
The present paper builds on our earlier work in Pitchford and Snyder (2003), which focused
on sequential location as a source of transactions costs and on the question of whether it is more
efficient for the court to assign property rights to the first mover or the second mover into an
area. The efficiency of property rights did not depend on the identity of the generator in our
earlier work because of assumptions in the model ensuring the generator’s ideal externality level
was not a function of its ex ante investment. In particular, we assumed that the externality was
constrained to lie in a bounded set [0, ē]; the recipient’s ideal externality level was at one corner,
zero, and the generator’s ideal externality level was at the other corner, ē. In the present paper,
we adopt the more natural assumption that the externality level is unbounded above, though it
continues to be bounded below by zero. Hence, the generator’s ideal externality level is an
interior solution that in general depends on its ex ante investment. The assumptions in our earlier
3

work simplified the analysis, but forced us to abstract from the strategic effects that are the focus
of the present paper. The model in both Pitchford and Snyder (2003) and the present paper is
related to the incomplete-contracts literature begun in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990) to explain ownership in a theory of the firm. As is standard in this literature,
in our model there is noncontractible investment ex ante but efficient bargaining ex post. The
possibility that injunction rights may lead a party to distort its investment to increase the harm it
can threaten another party in externality problems was noted informally by Mumey (1971), and is
related to the extensive literature on blackmail (Landes and Posner 1975, Epstein 1983, Lindgren
1984, Helmholz 2001, Posner 2001, Gomez and Ganuza 2002). A by-product of our analysis is a
comparison of damages versus injunction rights, the topic of a large literature including Calabresi
and Melamed (1972), Ayers and Talley (1995), Kaplow and Shavell (1995, 1996), and Sherwin
(1997).

2. Model
The variety of definitions in the economics literature (Cornes and Sandler 1996) suggest how
difficult it is to define the concept of an externality, let alone the concepts of generator and
recipient that underlie Coase’s (1960) debate with Pigou (1912). Thus, we devote considerable
attention in Appendix A to a rigorous discussion of general definitions of the generator and
recipient. To simplify discussion in the body of the paper, however, most of the analysis will
focus on the simple characterization of a unidirectional, purely negative externality provided in
this section. Appendix A traces the connection between the general definitions and the simple
characterization provided here. Extensions to other cases besides purely negative externalities
will be analyzed in Section 5.2.
The model has two periods, an ex ante and an ex post period, two players i = 1, 2, and a court,
which specifies and enforces a property-rights rule. In the ex ante period, the court specifies a
property-rights regime. Then player 1 becomes aware of an opportunity to sink investment
expenditure x1 ∈ [0, ∞) in a specific location. The land on which player 1 invests is assumed
4

to have been purchased in a competitive market at a price of zero.2 Player 2 arrives in the ex
post period. It has the opportunity to invest x2 ∈ [0, ∞) at a location near player 1.3 Location
in the nearby area leads to a negative externality e ∈ [0, ∞) between the players. We assume
the players can engage in frictionless bargaining over x2 and e, so that they end up choosing the
levels which maximize their joint payoff. The sole transaction cost in the model is that players
cannot bargain over x1; this follows directly from our assumption of ex ante anonymity, i.e., that
the identity of player 2 is unknown to player 1 when 1 makes its ex ante investment decision.4
Let ui (xi , e) be the gross surplus function for player i = 1, 2. We will maintain a number
of assumptions on ui (xi, e) throughout the paper (Assumptions 1–5) including differentiability,
concavity, and a series of Inada-type conditions ensuring interior solutions for the privately and
socially optimal level of xi and for the generator’s optimal stand-alone externality level. Since
these assumptions are standard regularity conditions not of central importance to the arguments of
the paper, they are relegated to Appendix B. Under these maintained assumptions, the definition
of a purely negative externality, which will be the focus of much of the subsequent analysis in
2

This simplifying assumption can be justified if the second-highest bidder in a second-price private-values auction
for the plot is neither a generator or recipient of the externality. If so, the land price will be independent of the
property-rights regime and can be netted out of player 1’s surplus function without loss of generality. More generally,
the land price may depend on the property-rights regime. Abstracting from this complication does not sacrifice much
generality because the land price only affects the extensive margin of whether 1 shows up in the location (taken for
granted in the model) and not its marginal investment incentives. See White and Wittman (1981, 1982) for a model
of externalities with endogenous location.
3
Player 2’s surplus function can be thought of as netting out the price of land following the logic of the previous
footnote. For 2 to win the land auction against other bidders that may be less affected by the externality problem, 2
must obtain quasi rents from locating in the area. If not, all externality problems could be solved by the land market
and would never be observed in practice. A number of interesting outcomes could emerge from explicitly modeling
the land auction. Assuming there are bidders who are affected by the externality but still obtain sufficient quasi rents
to outbid those that are less affected, and assuming these bidders are fairly homogeneous, then the land price would
be bid up to player 2's equilibrium surplus. The main results of the model would go through unchanged (the sole
minor change being that the land price paid by 2 would extract all of its equilibrium bargaining surplus). Assuming
instead that bidders are fairly heterogeneous in both their quasi rents and the effect of the externality effect on them,
an additional strategic effect would arise in that the player 1's investment would affect the identity of the second
mover who wins the auction for the land. We abstract from this selection effect in this paper.
4
The implicit assumption is that 1 has perfect foresight regarding 2’s surplus function but not 2’s identity. This
assumption simplifies the presentation of the results but is not crucial. The assumption could be dropped by extending
the model to allow for a distribution over the second-mover's preferences and having the first mover maximize an
expectation over this distribution. There also might be other sources of contractual incompleteness besides ex ante
anonymity. As in Grossman and Hart (1986), there may be resolution of uncertainty over time that makes contracting
easier ex post than ex ante. Alternatively, the externality may be expected to harm one of a large number of current
neighbors but unknown exactly which, and a collective-action problem may prevent efficient ex ante bargaining.
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Figure 1: Gross Surplus Functions in the Case of a Purely Negative Externality
the paper, can be made precise.
Definition 1. Let player i be the recipient of a unilateral externality e. Then e is a purely
negative externality if and only if ∂ui(xi , e)/∂e < 0 for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞).
Definition 1 implies that the recipient suffers increasing harm from higher levels of a purely
negative externality. Its preferred externality level is thus zero. It is also straightforward to
characterize the generator in the case of a purely negative externality. Starting from the general
definition of the generator as the party that chooses an action leading to the externality (Definition 6 in Appendix A), under maintained regularity conditions (Assumptions 2, 4, and 5 in
Appendix B), the identity of the generator reduces to the identity of the party whose surplus is
initially increasing in e, reaching an interior optimum, and then declining for larger e.
With a purely negative externality, the key distinction between the generator and recipient
then is that the recipient’s preferred externality level, zero, does not vary with its investment,
while in general the generator’s may. Referring to Figure 1, taking i to the be recipient, an
increase in its investment from xi to xi does not affect its preferred externality level, which is a
corner solution at zero. In contrast, taking j to be the generator, an increase in its investment will
affect its desired externality level. This strategic effect depends on the sign of the cross partial
6

derivative ∂ 2uj /∂xj ∂e. Figure 1 depicts the case in which ∂ 2uj /∂xj ∂e > 0, so that an increase
in the generator’s investment from xj to xj increases its marginal benefit from an additional unit
of e, in turn implying that its preferred externality level increases. (This case would arise, for
example, if investment increases the size of the generator’s facility; the larger the facility, the
more pollution generated when the facility is run at optimal capacity.) In this case, by investing
more, the generator can increase the harm it can credibly threaten to inflict on the recipient.
The absence of this effect with the recipient, and its presence with the generator, is the
fundamental asymmetry that will lead to our main results in Section 4. It is important to point
out, however, that this asymmetry is not necessarily present in all cases. As shown in Section 5.2
if the externality is mixed rather than being purely negative, the asymmetry between generator
and recipient may be reduced or eliminated.
Let v1(x1, e) = u1 (x1, e) − x1 be 1’s surplus net of investment. Let
v2 (e) = max [u2(x2, e) − x2]
x2 ∈[0,∞)

be 2’s. It turns out to be convenient to specify the second-mover’s net surplus as the value
function v2(e) because x2 is chosen after players bargain and can be set at the private and social
optimum, and so does not have an important bearing on the analysis. Define
e∗1(x1 ) = argmax v1(x1, e)
e∈[0,∞)

e∗2

= argmax v2(e)
e∈[0,∞)

∗∗

e (x1 ) = argmax [v1(x1 , e) + v2 (e)] .
e∈[0,∞)

In words, e∗1(x1 ) and e∗2 are the privately optimal externality levels in the players’ stand-alone
problems, and e∗∗(x1) is the joint optimum.
The notation indexes the timing of players’ moves independently of the identity of the generator/recipient and the identity of the rights holder. This will facilitate the analysis of a variety of
cases including (a) the case in which rights are allocated to the first mover, and the first mover
7

happens to be the recipient of an externality, (b) the case in which rights are allocated to the first
mover, and the first mover happens to be the generator of the externality, and (c) analogous cases
in which rights are allocated to the second mover. All of these cases will be analyzed below.
Player 1’s ex ante choice of x1 affects both players’ equilibrium allocations through the
bargain that takes place between players ex post. We assume efficient bargaining, in particular
the version of Nash (1950) bargaining in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) involving an
exogenous probability of breakdown ex post. Let α ∈ (0, 1) be player 1’s share of the gains from
Nash bargaining and 1 − α be 2’s share. If bargaining breaks down, the default or threat-point
outcome is determined by the property-rights regime specified by the court ex ante. That is, a
breakdown in bargaining leaves the players to select e according to the property rights specified
by the court. Let ti (x1) be player i’s threat-point payoff. Since the threat points typically involve
an inefficient choice of e, players will bargain to the ex-post efficient choice of e. Let s(x1)
denote the resulting maximized joint surplus:
s(x1 ) =

max [v1(x1, e) + v2(e)]

(1)

= v1(x1, e∗∗(x1 )) + v2(e∗∗(x1)).

(2)

e∈[0,∞)

Player 1’s equilibrium surplus from Nash bargaining is the sum of its threat point t1(x1) and
α times the gains from bargaining s(x1) − t1(x1 ) − t2 (x1), which upon rearranging equals
(1 − α)t1 (x1 ) + αs(x1) − αt2 (x1).

(3)

Since it is based on net utility functions, expression (3) already nets out 1’s investment expenditure
x1 and thus reflects player 1’s surplus from an ex ante perspective. Equation (3) is thus the
relevant objective function player 1 maximizes when choosing x1. We only need to specify
player 1’s ex ante payoff function because 1’s choice of x1 is the only welfare-relevant one in
the model. All other variables (x2 and e) are chosen optimally ex post conditional on x1 due to
efficient bargaining.

8

3. First-Mover Property Rights
The court sets the property-rights regime ex ante. Property rights enter the model by determining
the threat points ti (x1). The threat points enter into 1’s objective function (3), and 1’s choice in
turn determines x1. In this subsection we will define various property-rights regimes; Section 4
will analyze their efficiency.
Property rights are multidimensional, specifying among other things the variables the holder
is allowed to choose, the penalty for infringement, and rules for determining the identity of the
holder. For example, property rights can be conditioned on the period in which the players show
up. Rights are often allocated to the first mover into a location whether it is a generator or
recipient, following the so-called “coming to the nuisance” doctrine. In theory, however, property
rights could also be allocated to the second mover. Second-party property rights will be analyzed
in Section 5.1. The present subsection and Section 4 will restrict attention to first-party rights
because the asymmetry between generator and recipient comes out most strongly in this case.
Besides restricting attention to first-party rights, we restrict attention further to two commonlystudied property-rights regimes, injunctions and damages. An injunction regime gives the holder
the right to set e if bargaining breaks down. If player 1 is the injunction-rights holder, it would
set e to maximize its stand-alone payoff, i.e., it would choose externality level e∗1(x1 ). The
threat-point payoffs corresponding to injunction rights are therefore t1(x1) = v1 (x1, e∗1(x1 )) and
t2(x1 ) = v2 (e∗1(x1)).
We formalize damage rights in the following way. The holder does not have the right to set
e—the other player does—but has the right to extract a payment equal to the difference between
its surplus if the externality level were set at its preferred level less its realized surplus. More
concretely, if player 1 is the damage-rights holder, player 2 has the right to set e but must pay
player 1 u1 (x1, e∗1 (x1)) − u1(x1 , e). Player 1’s threat-point payoff equals its realized surplus
u1(x1 , e) − x1 plus the damage payment, which upon rearranging, equals t1(x1 ) = v1 (x1, e∗1(x1 )).
To compute t2(x1 ), we need to solve for 2’s optimal choice of e if bargaining breaks down. This

9

Table 1: Threat-Point Payoffs for First-Mover Property-Rights Regimes
First-mover
property-rights regime

Abbreviation

Player 1’s threatpoint payoff t1 (x1 )

Player 2’s threatpoint payoff t2 (x1 )

Injunction rights

FIR

v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 ))

v2 (e∗1 (x1 ))

Damage rights

FDR

v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 ))

s(x1 ) − v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 ))

choice maximizes 2’s surplus minus the damage payment, which upon rearranging equals
u1(x1 , e) + v2 (e) − u1 (x1, e∗1(x1 )).

(4)

It is straightforward to see that expression (4) is maximized by setting e to the joint optimum
e∗∗(x1). Substituting e∗∗(x1 ) for e in (4) and rearranging, we have t2(x1 ) = s(x1 )−v1 (x1, e∗1(x1 )).
Table 1 lists the threat points for reference. Note that t1 (x1) is the same in both injunctions
and damages regimes; the rights regimes only differ in the specification of t2(x1 ). Throughout
the next section we will refer to the first-mover injunction regime simply as “injunctions” and a
first-mover damages regime simply as “damages.”

4. Analysis
This section analyzes equilibrium investment and social welfare for the case of first-party rights
and for the case of a unidirectional, purely negative externality. We will show that the generator
of an externality differs in an economically meaningful way from the recipient in this case. To
do this, we determine the social ranking of rights regimes in the case in which player 1 is the
recipient (Proposition 1) and compare this ranking with the case in which player 1 is the generator
(Proposition 2). Before turning to Propositions 1 and 2, we prove Lemma 1 as a preliminary
result. Lemma 1 verifies that the recipient’s preferred level of the externality is zero and that
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the socially preferred level lies strictly between the recipient’s and generator’s preferred choices.
The results will be used in the proofs of the subsequent propositions.
Lemma 1. Suppose the externality is unidirectional and purely negative and that Assumptions 1
through 5 hold.
(a) If player 1 is the generator and player 2 is the recipient, then 0 = e∗2 < e∗∗(x1) < e∗1(x1 ).
(b) If player 1 is the recipient and player 2 is the generator, then 0 = e∗1(x1 ) < e∗∗(x1 ) < e∗2 .
The proofs of Lemma 1 and subsequent propositions are contained in Appendix C.
As discussed in Section 2, the efficiency of a rights regime is completely determined in the
model by how close ex ante investment x1 is to the first best since x1 is the only variable not
set by frictionless bargaining. In equilibrium, x1 may be either too high or too low relative to
the first best, depending on the interaction between the recipient’s investment and the externality,
which in formal terms depends on the sign of the second cross partial ∂ 2 u1(x1 , e)/∂x1∂e.
Definition 2. Investment increases recipient i’s vulnerability if an increase in xi increases i’s
marginal harm from the externality; i.e., ∂ 2ui (xi , e)/∂xi∂e < 0.
For example, in the Thrasher v. Atlanta case, the homeowner, the recipient of the airport’s
noise externality, could invest in a big house with fine construction details, thus exposing more
housing value to the noise externality. Such investments are referred to as increasing the homeowner’s vulnerability. Alternatively, the homeowner could build the house farther from the
property lines with soundproofed walls. As the following definition states, we refer to such
investment as decreasing the homeowner’s vulnerability.
Definition 3. Investment reduces recipient i’s vulnerability if an increase in xi reduces i’s
marginal harm from the externality; i.e., ∂ 2ui (xi , e)/∂xi∂e > 0.
Let xFIR
be player 1’s equilibrium ex ante investment if it holds injunction rights, xFDR
if it
1
1
first-best investment. (The F in the superscript designates that
holds damage rights, and x1ST
1
is closer to x1ST
than
rights are allocated to the first mover.) The next proposition states that xFIR
1
1
xFDR
1 —and so injunctions are more efficient than damages—if 1 is the recipient.
11

Proposition 1. Suppose the following: the externality is unidirectional and purely negative,
Assumptions 1 through 5 hold, player 1 is the recipient and the rights holder, player 2 is the
generator, investment either increases 1’s vulnerability for all x1 , e ∈ [0, ∞) or decreases 1’s
vulnerability for all x1 , e ∈ [0, ∞), and α ∈ (0, 1).
(a) Social welfare is strictly less than in the first best with both injunctions and damages.
(b) Injunctions are strictly socially more efficient than damages.
(c) If player 1’s investment reduces its vulnerability, then there is underinvestment in both
1ST
regimes relative to the first best, with xFDR
< xFIR
1
1 < x1 .
(d) If player 1’s investment increases its vulnerability, then there is overinvestment in both
< xFIR
< xFDR
regimes relative to the first best, with x1ST
1
1
1 .
The logic behind the main result in Proposition 1—that injunctions are more efficient than
damages if the rights-holding player 1 is a recipient—can be seen by comparing the distortion in
player 1’s investment incentives if it holds injunction rights with that if it holds damage rights.
First we will compute the investment distortion under injunction rights, labeled ΔI . To do this
we will subtract player 1’s surplus function under injunctions from the first-best surplus, and
then differentiate to obtain the distortion in marginal investment incentives.
Player 1’s surplus under injunctions is derived by substituting the relevant threat points from
Table 1 into the expression for the Nash bargaining surplus (3), yielding
(1 − α)v1(x1 , e∗1(x1)) + αs(x1 ) − αv2(e∗1 (x1)).

(5)

Subtracting (5) from the first-best objective function s(x1 ) yields
(1 − α)[v1(x1, e∗1(x1 )) − s(x1)] + αv2(e∗1 (x1)).

(6)

Differentiating (6) with respect to x1 and manipulating the resulting expression (by applying the
Envelope Theorem and Fundamental Theorem of Calculus) yields
I

Δ = (1 − α)



e∗∗ (x1 )
e∗1 (x1 )

de∗ (x1)
∂ 2v1(x1 , e)
de + αv2 (e∗1(x1)) 1
∂x1∂e
dx1
12

(7)

as the distortion for injunctions. Second, we will compute the investment distortion under damages. Player 1’s surplus function under damages is derived as equation (5) by substituting the
relevant threat points from Table 1 into equation (3), giving
v1 (x1, e∗1(x1 )) − s(x1 )

(8)

for damages. Subtracting (8) from s(x1), differentiating with respect to x1 , and rearranging gives
the investment distortion under damages, ΔD :
D

Δ =



e∗∗ (x1 )
e∗1 (x1 )

∂ 2v1 (x1, e)
de.
∂x1∂e

(9)

The first term in each of ΔI and ΔD is the distortion due to the fact that player 1’s surplus
depends in part on its threat point rather than solely on social surplus. This distortion is larger
in ΔD than in ΔI for all α > 0 (because ΔI involves the leading factor 1 − α). Intuitively,
there is no need for bargaining with damage rights because the damage payment induces player 2
to set the externality efficiently. Thus, player 1’s equilibrium surplus is solely its threat point,
implying that 1 does not internalize any of 2’s surplus. An injunction right induces a more
encompassing objective function since it allows player 1 to obtain a share of joint surplus in
proportion to its bargaining power. On these grounds alone, damages would be more distortionary
than injunctions.5
However, the second term in ΔI —reflecting the distortion in player 1’s investment to gain
a better bargaining position by worsening 2’s threat point—must still be accounted for. In
principle, this second term further distorts investment from the first best: below we will show
5

An alternative damage-rights regime, which we will label “perfect” damages, involves a compensation payment
that returns 1 to the surplus it would have earned if e were set at the social optimum, e∗∗ (x1 ) (rather than at its
stand-alone optimum, e∗1 (x1 ), as with “plain” damages). The first best can be obtained if perfect damages are
allocated to player 1. Mathematically, this can be seen in equation (9): moving from plain to perfect damages would
cause the lower limit of integration to change from e∗1 (x1 ) to e∗∗ (x1 ) thus causing the entire integral to disappear,
eliminating any investment distortion. Perfect damages may be informationally burdensome to implement in practice:
whereas the court might be able to determine the actual surplus player 1 earned while it was alone in the area and
use this as a basis to compute plain damages, the court would somehow have to estimate two counterfactuals—the
first-best externality level e∗∗ (x1 ) and 1’s surplus at this externality level—to implement perfect damages.
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that if player 1 is the generator then this second term has the same sign as the first and thus
exacerbates the distortion. However, if player 1 is the recipient of a purely negative externality
as we are positing here, e∗1(x1) = 0, implying de∗1 (x1)/dx1 = 0, in turn implying that the second
term in ΔI disappears. This is precisely where the fact that the recipient’s preferred externality
level is a corner solution comes into play. For the recipient of a purely negative externality, only
the first term of ΔI remains, which, as argued in the previous paragraph, is less than the first
term of ΔD for all α > 0. In other words, for α > 0, injunctions distort investment less than
damages.
Parts (c) and (d) of Proposition 1 can be summarized together as saying that if player 1
is the recipient of a purely negative externality, its investment will always be distorted in the
direction of making it more vulnerable whether it holds injunction or damage rights. (In particular,
part (c) says that 1 will underinvest if investment reduces its vulnerability, and part (d) says 1
will overinvest if investment increases its vulnerability.) Player 1 does not fully internalize its
vulnerability to the externality because, as the rights holder, it is insulated from harm from the
externality in its threat point.
The preceding discussion allows us to characterize some knife-edged cases not covered by
Proposition 1. First, if α = 0, injunctions and damages are equally socially efficient, though
both are strictly less efficient than the first best, as can be seen by substituting α = 0 into (7)
and (9). Second, if α = 1, injunctions yield the first best and are strictly more efficient than
damages. This can be seen by substituting α = 1 into (7) and noting that d∗1 (x1)/dx1 = 0 if 1
is the recipient. Third, if ∂ 2u1(x1 , e)/∂x1∂e = 0 for all x1 , e ∈ [0, ∞), injunctions and damages
both yield the first best, since the first term in both (7) and (9) disappears.
We next turn to the analysis of the case in which player 1 is the generator. Although the
investment distortion terms ΔI and ΔD were derived in the middle of the analysis of the case
in which player 1 is the recipient, they are perfectly general and apply as well to the case in
which player 1 is the generator. As mentioned, if player 1 is the generator, the second term in
ΔI typically does not disappear because e∗1(x1 ) is an interior solution with de∗1 (x1)/dx1 = 0.
Which is larger, the two terms in ΔI or the single term in ΔD , depends on functional forms
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and parameters. The next proposition provides some cases in which damages are socially more
efficient than injunctions if player 1 is a generator, in contrast to the case where player 1 is a
recipient. A series of definitions concerning the type of technology that the generator can adopt
will allow us to state the proposition succinctly. An investment is said to be “dirty” if higher
levels increase the generator’s marginal benefit from the externality. For example, in the Thrasher
v. Atlanta case, if the noise generated by the airport is in proportion to the number of takeoffs and
landings, expanding the scale of the airport’s operation will naturally increase its benefit from
an extra interval of noise. Alternatively, a “clean” investment reduces the marginal benefit from
pollution. This could occur, for example, if the airport buys new airplanes that are quieter than
the old ones. Formally, we have the following definitions.
Definition 4. Generator i’s investment is clean if an increase in xi reduces i’s marginal benefit
from the externality; i.e., ∂ 2ui (xi , e)/∂xi∂e < 0.
Definition 5. Generator i’s investment is dirty if an increase in xi increases i’s marginal benefit
from the externality; i.e., ∂ 2ui (xi , e)/∂xi∂e > 0.
Proposition 2. Suppose the following: the externality is unidirectional and purely negative,
Assumptions 1 through 5 hold, player 1 is the generator and rights holder, player 2 is the
recipient, v1(x1 , e) = g(x1) + γh(x1 , e) for some γ > 0, and α ∈ (0, 1).
(a) Both injunctions and damages are strictly socially inefficient compared to the first best.
< xFDR
<
(b) If player 1’s investment is dirty, there exists γ  such that for all γ < γ , x1ST
1
1
FIR
x1 , and social welfare is higher with damages than with an injunction.
FDR
<
(c) If player 1’s investment is clean, there exists γ  such that for all γ < γ  , xFIR
1 < x1
1ST
x1 , and, again, social welfare is higher with damages than with an injunction.

Given the functional form for player 1’s surplus, v1(x1 , e) = g(x1 ) + γh(x1 , e), as γ becomes small, the impact of the externality on its total and marginal payoff becomes negligible, whereas the choice of externality by the generator is unaffected by γ since e∗1(x1 ) solves
∂h(x1, e∗1(x1 )/∂e ≡ 0. In other words, player 1 does not benefit much from polluting, but since
the benefit is positive, its ideal pollution level can remain relatively high. Under an injunction it
can continue credibly to threaten the other party with substantial harm from the externality. Thus,
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the strategic incentive that the generator has to harm the recipient through its choice of externality
does not vanish. Under damages, as γ becomes small, player 1’s marginal investment incentives,
∂g(x1)/∂x1 +γ∂h(x1, e∗1 (x1))/∂x1 approach ∂g(x1)/∂x1; i.e., marginal investment incentives are
negligibly influenced by the externality. In the first best, marginal social investment incentives,
∂g(x1)/∂x1 + γ∂h(x1, e∗∗(x1 ))/∂x1, also approach ∂g(x1)/∂x1. Therefore, social welfare under
damages approaches the first best.
The discussion surrounding equations (7) and (9) allows us to immediately characterize some
knife-edged cases not covered by Proposition 2. If α = 0, social welfare is the same whether
the first-party generator is allocated an injunction or damage right, though both are strictly
less efficient than the first best, as can be seen by substituting α = 0 into (7) and (9). If
∂ 2h(x1 , e)/∂x1∂e = 0 for all x1, e ∈ [0, ∞), injunctions and damages both yield the first best.
This result holds because the integrand in the first term in both (7) and (9) disappears; the second
term in (7) also disappears because de∗1(x1 )/dx1 = 0 if ∂ 2h(x1, e)/∂x1∂e = 0. Combined with
the result from above that the first best is obtained if either injunction or damage rights are
allocated to a first-party recipient if its surplus function satisfies ∂ 2u1(x1 , e)/∂x1∂e = 0 for all
x1, e ∈ [0, ∞), we have that the first best can be obtained regardless of the allocation of property
rights and the identity of the generator if there is no interaction effect between x1 and e in 1’s
surplus function.
Under what conditions can the identified strategic effect, which leads to the asymmetry between the generator and recipient, be expected to lead to substantial social costs? One basic
condition is that expenditures on x1 be substantial, for this is the sole source of distortion in
the model. Other conditions can be understood from an examination of the second term in (7),
which is the mathematical expression for the asymmetric strategic effect. The distortion is larger
if investment and the externality are mainly used for offensive rather than socially productive
purposes, i.e., if e∗1(x1) has a large effect on the threat point, and x1 has a large effect on e∗1(x1 ),
but x1 has little effect on social welfare given the efficient externality choice e∗∗(x1). The distortion is also larger the higher is α. If α is high, the only source of surplus for player 2 is its threat
point, and so the only way for 1 to extract surplus from 2 is to distort its investment to harm 2’s
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threat point. The law can target such cases by, for example, taking away property rights if they
are abused solely to injure the other party.6 In practice it may be difficult to condition rights on
abuse/intent and simpler to condition rights on the identity of the generator/recipient.

5. Extensions
5.1. Second-Mover Property Rights
The analysis has so far been restricted to property rights allocated to the first mover in the area.
We restricted attention to this case for two reasons. One reason is that the greatest asymmetry
between generator and recipient is exhibited by this case. The asymmetry between generator and
recipient is less apparent with second-mover property rights because, as we will see from the
main result proved in this subsection, the same rights regime will be efficient whether the rights
holder is a generator or recipient. Another reason is that, while a particular second-mover rights
regime will turn out to attain the first best in our simple model, in a richer model second-mover
rights can be quite inefficient. In a fully specified dynamic model, second-mover rights would
induce players to engage in a war of attrition, delaying until the other player moves in order to
be second and win the property rights. The resulting delay may waste a considerable amount of
social welfare. In addition, we have abstracted from player 1’s decision to show up in the area.
Player 2 may extract so much surplus from 1 if 2 holds the rights that 1 decides not to show up,
again leading to a substantial loss of social welfare. The remainder of this subsection abstracts
from these complexities, but they should be kept in mind as caveats to the result that the first
best is attained by a particular second-mover rights regime.
For reference, Table 2 lists the threat points for the two rights regimes that will be considered
in this subsection: second-mover injunctions and damage rights. Substituting the threat points into
the Nash bargaining formula (3) yields the following objective function determining player 1’s
equilibrium investment:
(1 − α)v1(x1 , e∗2) + αs(x1 ) − αv2(e∗2)
6

See Hale (1946) for additional relevant (and interesting) cases of malicious injury in tort law.
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(10)

Table 2: Threat-Point Payoffs for Second-Mover Property-Rights Regimes
Second-mover
property-rights regime

Abbreviation

Player 1’s threatpoint payoff t1 (x1 )

Player 2’s threatpoint payoff t2 (x1 )

Injunction rights

SIR

v1 (x1 , e∗2 )

v2 (e∗2 )

Damage rights

SDR

s(x1 ) − v2 (e∗2 )

v2 (e∗2 )

if player 2 holds an injunction right and
s(x1) − v2(e∗2)

(11)

if player 2 holds a damage right. To compute an expression for investment distortion, we subtract
the first-best objective function from each of (10) and (11) and differentiate with respect to x1 ,
giving


(1 − α)

e∗2
e∗∗ (x1 )

∂ 2v1 (x1, e)
de
∂x1∂e

(12)

for injunctions and zero for damages.
The calculations thus show that there is no distortion with second-mover damage rights. The
first best is attained. Intuitively, if player 2 holds damage rights, player 1 internalizes 2’s surplus
through the damage payment and thus makes the efficient externality choice ex post and the
efficient investment choice ex ante. Since no mention has been made regarding the identity the
generator and recipient, second-mover damage rights obtain the first best regardless of which
player is which.
As equation (12) shows, there is typically a distortion if player 2 holds an injunction right.
Player 1 distorts its investment to make itself less vulnerable to expropriation when 2 sets the
externality at e∗2 in the threat point. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
The proof is straightforward from the discussion in this subsection and is omitted.
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Proposition 3. Suppose the following: the externality is unidirectional and purely negative,
Assumptions 1 through 5 hold, player 2 is the rights holder, ∂ 2v1(x1 , e)/∂x1∂e is nonzero and
has the same sign for all x1, e ∈ [0, ∞), and α ∈ (0, 1).
(a) The first best is obtained if damage rights are allocated to player 2 regardless of whether
it is the generator or recipient.
(b) Social welfare is strictly less than the first best if injunction rights are allocated to
player 2.
It is easy to see from (12) that in the knife-edged case of α = 1 not covered by Proposition 3,
the distortion (12) disappears and the first best is also obtained if injunction rights are allocated
to player 2.

5.2. Mixed Externalities
The analysis has so far been restricted to purely negative externalities. Another possibility is
that the externality is mixed, providing a marginal benefit to the recipient at low levels but
marginal harm at higher levels.7 For example, consider the Thrasher v. Atlanta case cited in the
Introduction, in which the plaintiff was a homeowner harmed by the noise from the defendant’s
nearby municipal airport. Suppose for the sake of argument that the plaintiff obtained some
benefits from the airport: increased local economic growth, better transportation, etc. The plaintiff
then might prefer a small airport to none, although at higher air-traffic levels the harm from the
noise might begin to outweigh the benefits. In this case, the municipal airport would be the
generator and the homeowner the recipient of a mixed externality.
Figure 2 depicts the mixed-externality case. The recipient is labeled i and the generator j.
The fact that the recipient’s surplus function ui (xi , e) is initially increasing in e implies that the
externality is positive at low levels. The fact that the recipient’s optimal stand-alone externality
level e∗i (xi ) is less than the generator’s e∗j (xj ) implies that the externality is marginally harmful
7

The general definitions of generator and recipient in Appendix A apply to the case of mixed externalities.
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Gross
surpluses

0

ei* ( xi )

e

e*j ( x j )

ui ( xi , e)
(i recipient)

u j ( x j , e)
( j generator)

Figure 2: Gross Surplus Functions in the Case of a Mixed Externality
to the recipient in equilibrium, as will be seen.8 ,9
The key difference between the analysis of a mixed and purely negative externality that will
emerge is that with a mixed externality, the recipient’s stand-alone optimum e∗i (xi) is an interior
solution, which may depend on its investment, raising the possibility of new strategic effects
that are absent with a purely negative externality. Recall that with a purely negative externality
the recipient’s stand-alone optimum was zero, independent of its investment. The richer set of
possibilities with mixed externalities requires care in organizing the relevant subcases. To avoid
a proliferation of subcases, we will return to the focus in Section 4 on first-party property-rights
regimes, in particular, injunction and damage rights.
First, suppose player 1 is the generator and 2 is the recipient. Analysis of mixed externalities
is identical to that for purely negative externalities in this case. Whether player 2’s stand-alone
optimum e∗2 is zero or an interior solution does not affect the proofs because e∗2 does not show
8

In most applications with mixed externalities, it is reasonable to suppose the recipient prefers lower levels of
the externality than the generator, but it is theoretically possible that the reverse is true. In such cases, the analysis
is similar to that for a purely positive externality and is omitted here since we are focusing on the problem of social
harm.
9
Note that ui (xi , e) is drawn so that i is better off with e = 0 than e = e∗j (xj ). This implies that the recipient
would rather do without the externality than allow the generator to pollute freely, an assumption that will be relied
on to eliminate cases in the subsequent analysis.
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up directly in player 1’s surplus function, as can be seen by substituting the entries in Table 1 in
to the bargaining-surplus function (3).
Next, suppose player 1 is the recipient and 2 is the generator. Mixed externalities raise new
possibilities in this case. Before proceeding with the analysis, a preliminary issue that must be
addressed is that the specification of injunction and damage rights become ambiguous with mixed
externalities. Consider the case of first-party injunction rights. One natural specification is that
the injunction is all or nothing, requiring the externality to cease if the injunction is enforced
(e = 0). Another natural specification is that the recipient can constrain the externality to be no
greater than its stand-alone optimum (e ≤ e∗1(x1)). We will call the first specification a “corner
injunction,” since e is forced to a corner at zero, and the second a “peak injunction,” since e
is constrained to the peak of 1’s surplus function. (This ambiguity did not arise with a purely
negative externality since the recipient’s surplus function peaked at the corner of zero.) The same
ambiguity arises with damage rights. One natural specification is that the recipient’s compensation
should make it as well off as it would be in the absence of the second party/generator, a regime
we will call “corner damages,” analogous to corner injunctions. Another is that the recipient’s
compensation make it as well off as it would be had e been set at its stand-alone optimum e∗1(x1 ),
a regime we will call “peak damages.”
There are two reasons for introducing corner and peak variants of the rights regimes. One
is that it is unclear a priori which is socially more efficient. Another is that there may be
technological barriers preventing the government from implementing a variant even if it would
otherwise be more efficient. For example, in the Thrasher airport case, it may be prohibitively
expensive for the government to monitor the frequency and decibel level of takeoffs and landings
as would be required to implement a peak injunction, but straightforward for the government to
shut the airport down, all that is required to implement a corner injunction. We expect that the
corner variants of both injunctions and damages regimes would generally require less information
and monitoring on the part of the government than their peak analogues in most applications and
thus would be easier to implement.
Table 3 provides the threat-point payoffs for the corner and peak variants of first-party in21

Table 3: Threat-Point Payoffs for Recipient of a Mixed Externality
First-mover
property-rights regime

Abbreviation

Player 1’s threatpoint payoff t1 (x1 )

Player 2’s threatpoint payoff t2 (x1 )

FCIR
FCDR

v1 (x1 , 0)
v1 (x1 , 0)

v2 (0)
s(x1 ) − v1 (x1 , 0)

FPIR
FPDR

v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 ))
v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 ))

v2 (e∗1 (x1 ))
s(x1 ) − v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 ))

Corner rights
Injunction rights
Damage rights
Peak rights
Injunction rights
Damage rights

junctions and damage rights. It is immediate that the threat points for the corner-rights regimes
are identical to those for the recipient of a purely negative externality. (To see this, compare the
entries in Table 3 to those from Table 1 after substituting the stand-alone optimum for the recipient of a purely negative externality, e∗1 (x1) = 0.) Thus, if attention is restricted to corner-rights
regimes, the analysis of mixed externalities is identical to the analysis in Section 4. In particular,
the conclusions of Proposition 1 continue to hold. Moreover, the asymmetry between generators
and recipients persists. Even though both have interior solutions for their optimal stand-alone
externality levels, it is the corner solution e = 0 that still factors into the recipient’s threat points
with corner rights.
With peak rights, the threat points for player 1 if it is the recipient of a mixed externality
from Table 3 have the same form as they would have if player 1 were the generator of a purely
negative externality from Table 1. The recipient of a mixed externality has an incentive to distort
its investment to affect its preferred externality level to inflict more harm on the second mover
in the threat point, just as does the generator of a purely negative externality. Hence, under
the peak variants of rights regimes, any asymmetry between generators and recipients of mixed
externalities is only a matter of degree not of kind. The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4. Suppose the following: the unidirectional externality is mixed with 0 < e∗1(x1) <
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e∗2, Assumptions 1 through 5 hold, player 1 is the recipient and rights holder, player 2 is the
generator, investment either increases 1’s vulnerability for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞) or decreases 1’s
vulnerability for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞), and α ∈ (0, 1).
(a) Social welfare is strictly higher under corner injunctions than corner damages.
(b) Let v1(x1, e) = g(x1 ) + γh(x1, e) for γ > 0. There exists γ  such that, for all γ < γ ,
social welfare is higher under peak damages than peak injunctions.
The next proposition compares the efficiency of corner-injunction rights with peak-injunction
rights. Intuition for the proposition comes from comparing expressions for the investment distortion under the two rights regimes. If player 1 is the recipient and holder of peak-injunction
rights, the distortion in its investment is precisely captured by ΔI in equation (7), repeated here:

(1 − α)

e∗∗ (x1 )
e∗1 (x1 )

∂ 2v1(x1 , e)
de∗(x1 )
.
de + αv2 (e∗1(x1 )) 1
∂x1∂e
dx1

(13)

If player 1 is the holder of a corner-injunction right, the distortion in its investment is similar to
(13) except for the substitution of the legally enforced externality level, zero, for e∗1 (x1), causing
the second term to drop out:

(1 − α)

e∗∗ (x1)
0

∂ 2v1(x1, e)
de.
∂x1∂e

(14)

If α = 0, the second term drops out of equation (13) as well, leaving the integral in both. The
range of integration in (14), from 0 to e∗∗(x1 ), is larger than in (13), from e∗1(x1) to e∗∗(x1 ).
The range of integration reflects the difference between the externality level in player 1’s threat
point and the efficient level; with a mixed externality, the recipient’s preferred externality level
is between zero and the efficient level. Since this is the only source of distortion if α = 0, the
distortion is larger with corner-injunction rights than peak-injunction rights. On the other hand,
if α = 1, the first term drops out of (13), leaving the second term, but the sole term drops out of
(14), leaving no distortion. If α = 1, therefore, corner-injunction rights attains the first best and
is more efficient than peak-injunction rights.
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Proposition 5. Suppose the following: the unidirectional externality is mixed with 0 < e∗1(x1) <
e∗2, Assumptions 1 through 5 hold, player 1 is the recipient and rights holder, player 2 is the
generator, investment either increases 1’s vulnerability for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞) or decreases 1’s
vulnerability for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞), and α ∈ (0, 1).
(a) Social welfare is strictly less than the first best with both corner and peak injunctions.
(b) For α sufficiently close to 0, social welfare is strictly higher under peak injunctions
than corner injunctions.
(c) For α sufficiently close to 1, social welfare is strictly higher under corner injunctions,
which approaches the first best, than under peak injunctions.
Comparing peak- with corner-damage rights reduces to comparing the investment distortion
under peak-damage rights,



e∗∗ (x1 )
e∗1 (x1 )

∂ 2v1(x1 , e)
de
∂x1∂e

(15)

which is identical to ΔD from equation (9), with the investment distortion under corner-damage
rights,



e∗∗ (x1 )
0

∂ 2v1 (x1, e)
de,
∂x1∂e

(16)

which is similar to equation (15) with 0 substituted for e∗1(x1). The integrals on the right-hand
side of equations (15) and (16) are the same except for differing ranges of integration. The
range is larger in (16) and thus there is unambiguously more distortion in investment with corner
damages than peak damages.
Proposition 6. Suppose the following: the unidirectional externality is mixed with 0 < e∗1(x1) <
e∗2, Assumptions 1 through 5 hold, player 1 is the recipient and rights holder, player 2 is the
generator, investment either increases 1’s vulnerability for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞) or decreases 1’s
vulnerability for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞), and α ∈ (0, 1).
(a) Social welfare is strictly less than the first best with both corner and peak damages.
(b) Social welfare is strictly higher under peak damages than corner damages.
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6. Conclusions
We presented a model with frictionless bargaining over the externality and other variables ex
post but with transactions cost in the form of non-contractible investment ex ante. We identified
a strategic effect in the model that affects generators and recipients differently in some cases.
The generator can distort its ex ante investment to make itself more harmful to the recipient,
thus increasing the surplus the generator extracts from the recipient in ex post bargaining. This
strategic effect is not always open to the recipient. For example, in the case in which the recipient
has an injunction right over a purely negative externality generated by the other party, the harm the
recipient can inflict on the generator by exercising the injunction is independent of the recipient’s
ex ante investment. We showed that property rights over the externality, which optimally should
be designed to minimize distortions in ex ante investment, can be made more efficient in some
cases by conditioning rights on the identity of the generator and recipient in a way that takes
account of the asymmetry in the identified strategic effect. Thus, the distinction between the
generator and the recipient can be economically meaningful in externality problems.
The asymmetry between the generator and recipient is less marked in some of the extensions to
the model discussed in Section 5. If the externality is mixed, the recipient’s preferred externality
level may be, like a generator’s, an interior solution, raising the possibility that the recipient’s
investment may be distorted, like a generator’s, if it is allocated an injunction right. However,
even in this case, there are natural specifications of property rights—corner rights—under which
the asymmetry between generator and recipient persists. If rights are given to the second mover
rather than the first, the same rights regime—damage rights allocated to player 2—is efficient
whether 2 is the generator or recipient. This result does not undermine our earlier results on
the asymmetry between the generator and recipient because it is an artifact of some simplifying
assumptions. Allocating rights to the second mover quickly becomes quite inefficient if certain
dynamic elements of the model are fully specified.
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Appendix A: General Definition of Generator and Recipient
Consider two players i and j with utility functions Ui (xi , ai, ej (aj )) and Uj (xj , aj , ei(ai )), respectively.
Player i’s utility, for example, is a function of its own investment expenditure xi ∈ [0, ∞), its own action
vector ai ∈ Ai (where Ai is i’s action space), and the externality ej (aj ) ∈ [0, ∞), which is a by-product
of the other player’s action aj ∈ Aj . The first two arguments of Ui —xi and ai —are choice variables for
player i, whereas the third—ej (aj )—results from a choice by the other firm. Ui and Uj are gross utility
functions in that they do not subtract off the cost of the investment expenditure xi .
We distinguish between i’s actions ai and the externality emanating from those actions ei (ai ) in order
to be clear about subtle issues related to the nature of ownership, control, and other legal rights. The law
regarding externalities overlies more basic ownership rights players have over their land and other assets.
The law regarding externalities may constrain ei (ai ). Within that constraint, however, the basic ownership
rights that i has over its land and other assets (residual rights of control in Grossman and Hart’s 1986
terms) allow it to choose ai (and xi ) freely. For example, if i is a factory, ai could include the inputs and
technology i uses in production; ei (ai) might be the pollution that results from production that flows into
neighboring land. A private legal action might end up constraining the factory’s pollution or requiring the
factory pay for harm caused by its pollution. Constraints on the factory’s input or technology choices are
more typically the result of direct regulation by statute than private legal action.
A deeper question is why private legal actions would target the externality ei (ai) rather than the
underlying actions ai . Presumably, the actor i will have better information and more skill than a court in
choosing the means to achieve the target ei (ai). Granting a third party, perhaps the other party involved in
the externality problem, rights to choose ai may give too it much bargaining power and lead to excessive
“hold up” (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978) of i’s investment.
With the specification of utilities in hand, we propose a general definition of generator and recipient.
The terms are defined jointly as follows.
Definition 6. Player j is a generator and i is the recipient of the externality ej if there exist aj and
aj ∈ Aj such that Ui (xi, ai , ej (aj )) = Ui (xi , ai , ej (aj )) for some xi ∈ [0, ∞) and ai ∈ Ai .
In words, the generator is a player that can, by altering actions under its control, affect the other player’s
utility; and the player so affected is the recipient. A few remarks about Definition 6 are in order. First,
the definition allows for the possibility that j generates an externality affecting i and vice versa, in which
case i and j would simultaneously be generators and recipients. Second, one can imagine taking any two
players and fabricating a generator/recipient relationship between them by allowing extreme enough actions
to be open to the generator, for example vandalism or assault. We are focusing here on externalities that
typically arise in economic applications such as pollution rather than extreme actions such as vandalism
or assault, which one can assume are forbidden by criminal law.
It is instructive to apply Definition 6 to cases in which identifying the generator and recipient might
be tricky. Consider the Bryant v. Lefever case in which the higher walls of the defendant’s renovated
house prevented the free circulation of air from the chimneys of the plaintiff’s neighboring house, causing
the chimneys to smoke [Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172 (1878–1879)]. Both parties contributed to the
chimney smoke: the plaintiff by building fires and the defendant by building a higher wall, so it might be
difficult to determine which is the generator. Definition 6 can be applied by taking the externality to be the
prevention of the free circulation of air. Building a higher wall (action aj ) rather than a lower wall (action
aj ), the defendant reduces the utility of the plaintiff given the number of fires ai > 0 the plaintiff chooses
to light; in formal terms, Ui (xi , ai, ej (aj )) > Ui (xi, ai , ej (aj )). According to Definition 6, the defendant
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is the generator of the externality and the plaintiff is the recipient. In Bass v. Gregory, the plaintiff’s
pub exhausted brewing gases into a duct that led into an unused well on the defendant’s property and
from there out into the air [Bass v. Gregory 25 Q.B.D. 481 (1890)]. The defendant covered the well,
presumably because he disliked the smell of the brewing gases, causing the gases to build up in the pub’s
cellar and disrupting brewing operations. According to Definition 6, both parties are generators and both
are recipients. The plaintiff’s action, brewing, creates fumes as a by-product which cause a nuisance on
the defendant’s property. The defendant can take an action, blocking the well, that makes the plaintiff
worse off by disrupting its brewing operations.
The preceding two cases involved purely negative externalities; that is, increases in the generators’
actions make the recipients worse off. Our general definitions of generator and recipient also apply to
positive and mixed externalities. Suppose that in Bass v. Gregory Gregory enjoys beer so much that
brewing fumes give him pleasure. Presumably there would be no reason for him to block the well, so
the only relevant externality would be the brewing gases entering Gregory’s property. The pub would
be the generator and Gregory the recipient of this positive externality. Definition 6 also applies to the
mixed-externality case discussed in Section 5.2.
We conclude this appendix by establishing the connection between Definition 6 and the simple characterization of a unilateral externality provided in Section 2. Letting i be the generator, if the externality only
flows in one direction, i cannot also be a recipient. Hence ej (aj ) drops out of i’s gross utility function,
which becomes Ui (xi , ai). Letting j be the recipient, its gross utility function remains Uj (xj , aj , ei(ai )).
It is notationally convenient to move from the direct utility functions Ui and Uj to the following indirect
utility functions. Let ui be generator i’s indirect utility function:

max Ui (xi , ai )
ai ∈Ai
(17)
ui (xi , e) =
subject to ei (ai ) = e.
Let uj be recipient j’s indirect utility function:
uj (xj , e) = max Uj (xj , aj , e).
aj ∈Aj

(18)

Defined in this way, players’ indirect utility functions conveniently have the same form (e.g., ui (xi, e) for
player i) whether they are generators or recipients. Section 2 starts with surplus functions of the form in
(17) and (18).

Appendix B: Regularity Conditions on Surplus Functions
We following regularity conditions on players’ surplus functions are maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. ui (xi , e) is continuously differentiable in both arguments for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞).
Assumption 2. ui (xi , e) is strictly concave for all xi , e ∈ [0, ∞).
Assumption 3. ui (xi , e) satisfies an Inada condition in xi ; i.e., ∂ui(0, e)/∂xi = ∞ for all e ∈ [0, ∞).
Assumption 4. The net utility function ui (xi , e) − xi is coercive; i.e.,
lim

xi,e→∞

[ui(xi , e) − xi ] = −∞,
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where xi , e =


x2i + e2 is the distance norm.

Assumption 5. If i is the generator, ui (xi , e) satisfies an Inada condition in e: ∂ui (xi , 0)/∂e = ∞ for
all xi ∈ [0, ∞).
Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard. Assumptions 3 and 4 ensure that the privately and socially optimal
investment levels are in the interior of [0, ∞). This is not essential for the results, but allows us to state our
propositions more elegantly with strict inequalities, eliminating a number of economically uninteresting
cases. Note that the assumption of coerciveness implies that both players’ net surpluses become very
negative if either the investment or the externality grow without bound. Assumption 5 ensures that the
generator’s privately optimal externality level and the socially optimal one are both in the interior of [0, ∞).
Again, this assumption is not essential for the results, but allows us to state our propositions more elegantly
with strict inequalities.

Appendix C: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1: We will prove part (a); the proof of part (b) is similar and thus omitted. Suppose
player 1 is the generator and 2 is the recipient. Then ∂u2 (x2 , e)/∂e < 0 by definition of the recipient,
implying v2 (e) < 0. Thus e∗2 = argmaxe∈[0,∞) v2 (e) = 0. Assumption 5 implies e∗∗ (x1 ) > 0. The proof
is completed by showing e∗∗ (x1 ) < e∗1 (x1 ). Consider the nested objective function
u1 (x1 , e) + v2 (e) − θv2 (e),

(19)

where θ = 0 yields the objective function for e∗∗ (x1 ) and θ = 1 that for e∗1 (x1 ). We proceed by verifying
the conditions required for Strict Monotonicity Theorem 1 of Edlin and Shannon (1998) hold for expression (19). Expression (19) is continuously differentiable because the individual terms are continuously
differentiable by Assumption 1. Assumptions 4 and 5 imply e∗1 (x1 ) is an interior solution. The second
cross partial of expression (19) with respect to e and θ equals −v2 (e) > 0. Hence, (19) exhibits increasing
marginal returns. Thus, Strict Monotonicity Theorem 1 of Edlin and Shannon (1998) applies, implying
e∗∗ (x1 ) < e∗1 (x1 ). 2

Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the case in which investment by player 1 (the recipient) reduces its
vulnerability. The case in which player 1’s investment increases its vulnerability is analyzed similarly and
thus omitted.
< xFIR
We will first prove xFDR
1
1 . Substituting the threat points associated with a damages regime from
Table 1 into expression (3), player 1’s ex ante equilibrium surplus under damages equals
v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 )).

(20)

Similarly, it can be shown that player 1’s ex ante equilibrium surplus under an injunction equals
(1 − α)v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 )) + αs(x1 ) − αv2 (e∗1 (x1 )).

(21)

Nesting (20) and (21), player 1’s objective function, determining its ex ante investment, can be written
v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 )) + θ[s(x1 ) − v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 )) − v2 (e∗1 (x1 ))],
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(22)

where θ = 0 under damages and θ = α under an injunction. The second cross partial of (22) with respect
to x1 and θ equals
dv1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 )) dv2 (e∗1 (x1 ))
−
dx1
dx1
∂v1 (x1 , 0)
= s (x1 ) −
∂x1
 e∗∗ (x1 ) 2
∂ v1 (x1 , e)
de.
=
∂x1 ∂e
0
s (x1 ) −

(23)
(24)
(25)

Equation (24) holds since player 1 is the recipient, so e∗1 (x1 ) = 0 by part (b) of Lemma 1. Since
e∗1 (x1 ) is a constant, the derivative in the third term of (23) is zero. Equation (25) holds by applying
the Envelope Theorem to find the derivative of s(x1 ) using the definition of s(x1 ) in equation (2),
and then by applying the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. To show (25) is positive, note first that
∂ 2 u1 (x1 , e)/∂x1 ∂e > 0 since investment reduces 1’s vulnerability, implying ∂ 2 v1 (x1 , e)/∂x1 ∂e > 0, and
note second that e∗∗ (x1 ) > 0 by Lemma 1. Hence, expression (22) exhibits increasing marginal returns in
x1 and θ. Steps similar to the proof of Lemma 1 can be used to show that Strict Monotonicity Theorem 1
< xFIR
implies xFDR
1
1 .
1ST
Next, we will show xFIR
1 < x1 . The objective function in the first best is s(x1 ). This can be nested
with the objective function under an injunction in expression (21) as follows:




α
∗
∗
v2 (e1 (x1 )) ,
(26)
s(x1 ) + θ s(x1 ) − v1 (x1 , e1 (x1 )) +
1−α
where θ = −(1 − α) under injunctions and θ = 0 in the first best. Arguments paralleling those in the
preceding paragraph can be used to show that the Strict Monotonicity Theorem 1 applies to expression
1ST
(26), implying xFIR
1 < x1 .
Next, we need to translate the investment ranking into a social-welfare ranking. By Assumption 2,
u2 (x2 , e) − x2 is strictly concave. Furthermore it is maximized over a convex set x2 ∈ [0, ∞). By the
Maximum Theorem under Convexity (see, e.g., Sundaram 1996, Theorem 9.17.3), the associated value
function v2 (e) is also strictly concave. By Assumption 2, u1 (x1 , e) is strictly concave, implying v1 (x1 , e)
is strictly concave. The sum of strictly concave functions v1 (x1 , e) + v2 (e) is strictly concave. By the
Maximum Theorem under Convexity, the associated value function s(x1 ) is strictly concave. Therefore,
< xFIR
< x1ST
implies damages are strictly less efficient than an injunction, which in
the ranking xFDR
1
1
1
turn is less efficient than the first best. 2

Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose v1 (x1, e) = g(x1) + γh(x1, e) for some g(x1) satisfying Assump-

tions 1–4; for some h(x1 , e) satisfying Assumptions 1–5; and for γ > 0. We will prove the proposition
for the case in which investment by player 1 (the generator) is dirty. The proof for the case in which its
investment is clean is similar and thus omitted.
< xFDR
for all γ > 0. Substituting the functional form for v1 into the
We will first show x1ST
1
1
threat points associated with the damage regime listed in Table 1 and then substituting the resulting threat
points into expression (3) yields the following expression for player 1’s ex ante equilibrium surplus under
damages:
(27)
g(x1 ) + γh(x1 , e∗1 (x1 )).
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Substituting our functional form for v1 into equation (2) yields the following expression for the social
welfare function in the first best:
g(x1 ) + γh(x1 , e∗∗(x1 )) + v2 (e∗∗ (x1 )).

(28)

Nesting the objective functions (27) and (28),
g(x1) + γh(x1, e∗∗ (x1 )) + v2 (e∗∗ (x1 )) + θ [γh(x1 , e∗1 (x1 )) − γh(x1 , e∗∗ (x1 )) − v2 (e∗∗ (x1 ))] ,

(29)

where θ = 0 for the first best and θ = 1 for the damages regime. The second cross partial of (29) with
respect to x1 and θ equals
d
d
[γh(x1, e∗1 (x1 ))] −
[h(x1 , e∗∗ (x1 )) + v2 (e∗∗ (x1 ))]
dx1
dx1




∂h(x1 , e∗∗ (x1 ))
∂h(x1 , e∗1 (x1 ))
−γ
= γ
∂x1
∂x1
 e∗ (x1) 2
1
∂ h(x1 , e)
de.
= γ
∂x1 ∂e
e∗∗ (x1 )

(30)
(31)
(32)

The first (respectively, second) term of equation (31) comes from differentiating the first (respectively,
second) term in square brackets in (30) using the Envelope Theorem. Equation (32) follows from the
Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. To see (32) is positive, note first that ∂ 2 h(x1 , e)/∂x1∂e > 0 because
1’s investment is dirty and note second that e∗∗ (x1 ) < e∗1 (x1 ) by part (a) of Lemma 1. Hence, expression
(29) exhibits increasing marginal returns in x1 and θ. Steps similar to the proof of Lemma 1 can be used
FDR
to show that Strict Monotonicity Theorem 1 implies x1ST
1 < x1 .
< xFIR
for all γ > 0. This fact, together with the fact from the previous
Next, we shown x1ST
1
1
1ST
FDR
paragraph that x1 < x1 , are sufficient to establish that both injunctions and damages are strictly socially
and xFIR
results in the same expression as in
inefficient. Nesting the objective functions determining x1ST
1
1
equation (26). The second cross partial of (26) with respect to x1 and θ equals

−

e∗1 (x1 )

e∗∗ (x1 )

∂ 2 h(x1 , e)
de +
∂x1 ∂e



α
1−α



v2 (e∗1 (x1 ))

de∗1 (x1 )
,
dx1

(33)

derived using steps similar to equations (30) through (32). Both terms in equation (33) are negative. The
first term is negative since it has the opposite sign of equation (32), which was shown to be positive. To
see that the second term is negative, note first that since player 2 is the recipient of a purely negative
externality, v2 (e∗1 (x1 )) < 0. Monotone comparative statics arguments similar to those used in the proof of
Lemma 1 can be used to prove that, under the maintained assumption that player 1’s investment is dirty,
de∗1 (x1 )/dx1 > 0.
< xFIR
for all γ ∈ (0, γ ). Substituting our
Finally, we show that there exists γ  > 0 such that xFDR
1
1
functional form for v1 into player 1’s objective function under an injunction, expression (21), and nesting
with its objective function under damages, expression (27), yields
g(x1) + γh(x1 , e∗1 (x1 , γ))

+ θ [γh(x1 , e∗∗(x1 , γ)) + v2 (e∗∗ (x1 , γ)) − γh(x1 , e∗1 (x1 , γ)) − v2 (e∗1 (x1 , γ))] , (34)
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where θ = 0 under damages and θ = α under an injunction. We have added an argument to e∗1 (x1 , γ)
and e∗∗ (x1 , γ) to reflect their dependence on γ, which we will vary in the comparative statics exercise to
follow. The second cross partial of (34) with respect to x1 and θ is
d
d
[γh(x1, e∗∗ (x1 , γ)) + v2 (e∗∗ (x1 , γ))] −
[γh(x1 , e∗1 (x1 , γ)) + v2 (e∗1 (x1 , γ))]
dx1
dx1




∂h(x1 , e∗∗ (x1 , γ))
∂e∗(x1 , γ)
∂h(x1 , e∗1 (x1 , γ))
= γ
.
−γ
− v2 (e∗1 (x1 , γ)) 1
∂x1
∂x1
∂x1

(35)
(36)

The first term in equation (36) comes from applying the Envelope Theorem to compute the derivative in
the first term of (35). The second and third terms in equation (36) come from applying the Envelope
Theorem to compute the derivative in the second term of (35). In the limit as γ → 0, the first and second
terms of (36) vanish, implying that the sign of (36) is determined by the sign of the third term. But the
third term in equation (36) has the opposite sign of the second term in equation (33), which was shown
to be negative. Hence the third term of (36) is positive, implying (36) is positive for sufficiently small
γ > 0. Therefore, (34) exhibits increasing marginal returns in x1 and θ for sufficiently small γ > 0. Steps
< xFIR
for sufficiently small γ > 0.
similar to the proof of Lemma 1 can be used to show that xFDR
1
1
Using arguments paralleling those in the last paragraph of the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that
the investment ranking translates into a social welfare ranking, so that damages are socially more efficient
than an injunction for sufficiently small γ > 0. 2

Proof of Proposition 4: Comparison of corner-injunction and corner-damage rights held by the recipient in the presence of a mixed externality is identical to a comparison of injunction and damage rights
held by the recipient in the presence of a purely negative externality. Therefore, part (a) of the proposition
follows from part (b) of Proposition 1. Comparison of peak-injunction and peak-damage rights held by
the recipient in the presence of a mixed externality is identical to a comparison of injunction and damage
rights held by the generator in the presence of a purely negative externality. Therefore, part (b) of the
proposition follows from parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 2. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: Analysis of corner-injunction (respectively, peak-injunction) rights held by
the recipient of a mixed externality is identical to the analysis of an injunction held by the recipient
(respectively, generator) of a purely negative externality. Therefore, part (a) of the proposition follows
from part (a) of Propositions 1 and 2.
To prove part (b), consider the case in which investment reduces the recipient’s vulnerability. The
analysis is similar for the case in which investment increases the recipient’s vulnerability and is omitted.
Nest the recipient’s objective functions for peak and corner injunctions as follows:
(1 − α)[v1 (x1 , 0) − s(x1 )] + αv2 (0)
+ θ v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 )) − v1 (x1 , 0) +



α
1−α



[v2 (e∗1 (x1 )) − v2 (0)] , (37)

be equilibrium
where θ = 0 for corner injunctions and θ = 1 − α for peak injunctions. Let xFCIR
1
FPIR
that under peak injunctions. Arguments used repeatedly in
investment under corner injunctions and x1
FPIR if the second cross partial of (37) with respect to x and
<
x
previous proofs can establish that xFCIR
1
1
1
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θ exhibits increasing marginal returns. This second cross partial equals

0

e∗1 (x1 )

∂ 2 v1 (x1 , e)
de +
∂x1 ∂e



α
1−α



v2 (e∗1 (x1 ))

de∗1(x1 )
.
dx1

(38)

In the limit as α → 0, the second term of (38) drops out. The first term, which remains, is positive because
< xFPIR
. Arguments along
∂ 2 v1 (x1 , e)/∂x1 ∂e > 0 if investment reduces 1’s vulnerability. Hence xFCIR
1
1
FPIR
1ST
< x1 . Arguments used repeatedly in previous
the lines of the proof of Proposition 2 can establish x1
FPIR < x1ST implies that peak-injunction rights are more
<
x
proofs can be used to prove that xFCIR
1
1
1
efficient than corner-injunction rights.
To prove part (c), in the limit as α → 1, the second term dominates (38). Arguments from the proof
of Proposition 2 can be used to establish that if ∂ 2 v1 (x1 , e)/∂x1∂e > 0, then de∗1 (x1 )/dx1 > 0. Further,
< xFCIR
. It is easy to see
0 < e∗1 (x1 ) < e∗2 implies v2 (e∗1 (x1 )) > 0. Hence, in the limit as α → 1, xFPIR
1
1
FCIR
1ST
= x1 in the limit as α → 1. Arguments used repeatedly in the previous proofs can be used
that x1
< xFCIR
= x1ST
implies that social-welfare in the limit as α → 1 has the ranking
to establish that xFPIR
1
1
1
given in part (c). 2

Proof of Proposition 6: Analysis of corner (respectively peak) damages held by the recipient of a
mixed externality is identical to damages held by the recipient (respectively, generator) of a purely negative
externality. Therefore, part (a) of the proposition follows from part (a) of Propositions 1 and 2.
To prove part (b), consider the case in which investment reduces 1’s vulnerability (the case in which
investment increases 1’s vulnerability is analyzed similarly). Nesting the objective functions for the
recipient of corner and peak damage rights:
v1 (x1 , 0) + θ[v1 (x1 , e∗1 (x1 )) − v1 (x1 , 0)],

(39)

be equilibrium investment under
where θ = 0 for corner damages and θ = 1 for peak damages. Let xFCDR
1
be
that
under
peak
damages.
Arguments
used
repeatedly
in the previous proofs
corner damages and xFPDR
1
FCDR
FPDR
< x1
if the second cross partial of (39),
can be used to show that x1

0

e∗1 (x1 )

∂ 2 v1 (x1 , e)
de,
∂x1 ∂e

(40)

is positive. But the facts that e∗1 (x1 ) > 0 and that investment reduces 1’s vulnerability imply (40) is
< x1ST
positive. It is easy to prove that xFPDR
1
1 . Arguments used repeatedly in the previous proofs can
FCDR
FPDR
< x1
< x1ST
implies peak damages are more efficient than corner
be used to establish that x1
1
damages. 2
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